This paper empirically demonstrates that foreign capital inflows and current account imbalances interact in different ways between developed countries and emerging market countries. Using the Granger non-causality test, we find that foreign capital inflows Granger-cause the current account in the cases of emerging market countries, while the causal relation is negligently detected in the cases of developed countries.
Introduction
The persistent and growing current account deficit of the U.S. since the 1990s and the corresponding surpluses of its counterparts from the rest of the world, particularly in the emerging market countries (EMCs), have instigated a large body of research on why this global imbalance occurs, when it will adjust, and how the adjustment will unravel (IMF, 2005; Bernanke, 2005; Clarida, 2006) . In resolving the seemingly puzzled issue of why international investors are willing to continuously finance the profligate U.S., the theory of the intertemporal current account balance model explicates that the current account imbalance is the reflection of economic agents' intertemporal optimization decision on consumption and investment (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1996) . Therefore, a current account imbalance, either its magnitude or duration, is irrelevant and should not spur any serious concern for policy makers.
However, there is concern that when the sentiment changes of the foreign investors -as when Calvo and Reinhart (1999) suggested a "sudden stop" of foreign capitals, which devastated the economies of EMCs during the 1990s' currency crises -might plague the U.S. as well.
1 Indeed, excessive capital inflows coupled with the persistent current account deficit that the U.S. now experiences is analogous to what the EMCs had prior to the 1990s' "capital account crisis". 2 The enduring U.S. current account deficit has been perceived as a portent of a day of reckoning, such as noted in Obstfeld and Rogoff (2004) and Roubini and Setser (2004) . 3 There is no shortage of arguments that developed countries in general and the
U.S. in particular are different from developing countries and the plight of what
EMCs experienced need not recur. 4 McKinnon (2001) and Poole (2005) argued that U.S. assets owned by international investors are mostly denominated in dollars and a large fraction of U.S. assets held abroad are denominated in foreign currencies. Dollar depreciation, should it occur in a hard-landing fashion, will be self-limiting.
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1 Calvo and Reinhart (1999) find that net private capital flows in terms of GDP to Mexico fell by 6% between 1993 and 1994; and that to South Korea and Thailand between 1996 and 1997 fell by 11% and 26%, respectively. 2 The succession of currency crises during the last decade of the 20 th century in emerging market countries was mostly preceded by large private capital inflows and triggered by sudden shifts in market sentiment, which led to massive capital flow reversals. These crises are described as "capital account crises" to distinguish them from the conventional crises that originate from the current account imbalance. See IMF (2003) . Note that since 1993 the balance of payment manual provided by IMF reclassified most items in the previous capital account into a newly-coined account, "financial account." Currently, the capital account keeps meager items, but its name usually refers to the financial account. Here, the "capital account crises" in fact indicate "financial account crises." 3 Obstfeld and Rogoff (2004) estimate that for the U.S. to restore the external balance, the trade weighted value of the U.S. dollar might have to depreciate as high as 40%. Roubini and Setser (2004) consider different scenarios for possible U.S. current account adjustments in a global economic framework and argue that an unpleasant one seems unavoidable. 4 We use EMCs and developing countries interchangeably in this paper. The EMCs make up a group of countries which are classified as developing countries with more dynamism in their economies relative to other developing countries. However, compared to the developed countries, either EMCs or developing countries have relatively immature financial and economic structures, which might be one of the reasons causing different adjustment processes on current accounts between EMCs and developed countries. 5 For the United States, unlike other countries in the world, a hard-landing process is inherently self-limiting. U.S. assets owned by international investors are predominantly denominated in dollars and a large fraction of U.S. assets held abroad are denominated in foreign currencies. Dollar depreciation, should it occur in a hard-landing process, will be self-limiting, because the dollar value of U.S. assets abroad will rise, thus improving the U.S. net international investment position. Market participants, knowing this fact, are therefore unlikely to drive down the foreign currency value of the dollar in a rapid and disruptive fashion. Accordingly, the current account reversal might be inevitable, but a disruptive adjustment in the U.S. is overstated.
There has recently been a surge of research attempting to tackle the issue of foreign capital inflows cum current account imbalances. This approach is based on testing whether there is a different causal relationship of the current account imbalance and foreign capital inflows between developed and developing countries.
To date, as far as the authors acknowledge, there are only a few studies, such as Fry, et al. (1995) , Wong and Carranza (1999) , Sarisoy-Guerin (2004) and Yan (2005) .
Within these studies, different causality testing approaches are implemented for different country sets and time periods, and they commonly investigate the causal relationships of the current account and foreign capital inflows by using the net capital inflows, i.e. the financial account from the balance of payment account. This paper attempts to further explore this causal relationship between current account imbalances and foreign capital inflows. We particularly distinguish our study from the extant research studies in two respects. The first is that we use the gross, instead of net, foreign capital inflows to investigate the causal relationship with the current account imbalance. Net foreign capital inflows are the difference between foreign and domestic residents' international investment behavior. If we want to know how foreign investors affect domestic current account imbalances, then it is more appropriate to use gross foreign capital inflows. Second, the emerging market countries' currency crises of the 1990s show that massive foreign capital inflows might cause a consumption spree or overinvestment. On the contrary, the sudden stop of foreign capital flows also causes a shortage on consumption or investment deficiency, and both could bring about a current account imbalance, as Bustelo (2000) argued that there were different impacts from foreign capital inflows to Latin American and Asian countries prior to their 1990s' currency crises. Therefore, determining the causality direction between foreign capital inflows and national savings or investment or both has critical policy implications. In addition, we discuss three possible reasons on why there are such different causal relationships between developed and emerging market countries.
Using the augmented Vector Autoregression (VAR) model to estimate and implement the Granger non-causality test, we find that for developed countries, gross foreign capital inflows show a negligible causal relationship with the current account; while for the emerging market countries it always seems true that foreign capital inflows Granger-cause current account imbalances. By investigating the two components of the current account, national saving and investment, the results of the causal relationship with foreign capital inflows mostly remain the same although in emerging market countries, there is evidence of different causal relationships between foreign capital inflows and national savings or investment.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the causes of the resurging capital inflows toward the emerging market countries and proposes the possible causal relationship between the current account and foreign capital inflows.
Section 3 describes the data used and explains the empirical testing strategy. Section 4 presents the empirical results and the conclusion is in Section 5.
Foreign Capital Inflows and the Current Account Imbalance
Although ex post balance of payment accounting is an accounting identity, there are various channels for the current account to affect the financial account, and vice versa. The intertemporal balance model of the current account, such as in Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) , provides the perspective of individual optimization behavior through an intertemporal decision. Accordingly, the current account imbalance indicates that the economic agent takes advantage of tapping international financial markets to smooth out its consumption over time in order to attain the intertemporal optimization. In practice, it appears true that developed countries mostly embrace the blessing of free capital mobility, yet developing countries are littered with cases of suffering from a boom-bust cycle to their economies from foreign capital flows, as indicated by Williamson (2005) .
Causes of foreign capital inflows and current account imbalances
Two issues need to be considered when dealing with how international capital mobility affects current account imbalances. One concerns the causes of the foreign capital inflows, and the other is about the policy response, as opined by Reinhart (1999) . Two factors which operate to attract foreign capital inflows are proposed -namely, "push" and "pull" factors -as noted in Goldstein (1995) and Agenor and Montiel (1999) . "Pull" factors, also called "internal" factors, are those that attract capital from abroad as a result of attractive domestic conditions, such as a higher marginal productivity of capital, the improved creditworthiness induced by better macroeconomic policy, and structural reform. "Push" factors, also called "external" factors, are those that operate by unfavorable conditions in the industrial countries, such as a low interest rate and recession, with particular emphasis on the U.S.
In their study of the revival of substantial international capital inflows to developing countries, Calvo, et al. (1993) found that it is the external factors, not internal factors, which explain the foreign capital inflows into Latin America. 8 Chuhan, et al. (1993) , using a wider sample of developing countries, concluded that "external" factors were much more important for capital inflows to Latin American than for those to Asia. 9 On the other hand, history shows that capital mobility has mostly occurred among developed countries, as noted in Obstfeld and Taylor (2002) .
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Only when developed countries have suffered from the low profitability of investment has capital moved to developing countries.
b. Policy response to foreign capital inflows and its effects on current account
When developing countries receive massive foreign capital inflows, an instant effect is an overheating economy due to an excessive expansion of aggregate demand.
In order to let air out from the inflated economy, four policy responses have been provided, including sterilization, exchange-rate policies, fiscal policies, and capital control, as opined by Goldstein (1995) , Reinhart and Reinhart (1998) , and Agenor and Montiel (1999) . Imposing capital control, practicing a contractionary fiscal policy, and adopting flexible exchange rate regimes -although effective -are relatively hard to implement politically and timely. As a result, sterilization is most commonly practiced 8 The conclusion of Calvo, et al. (1993) is based on the finding that international reserve accumulation and real exchange rate appreciation in Latin American capital-receiving countries were highly correlated with various U.S. financial variables. 9 Chuhan, et al. (1993) studied 9 Latin American and 9 Asian countries. Their findings are based on extending the work of Calvo, et al. (1993) and including additional variables, such as the secondary market price of a country's debt, credit rating, the stock price-earnings ratio, the relative return on the domestic stock market, and black market premium. 10 Obstfeld and Taylor (2002) argued that capital was biased towards developed countries pre-1914, as is the situation today. Although net flows (inflows minus outflows) have been held constant at relatively low levels for the past 30 years, gross flows (inflows plus outflows) have increased tremendously, because capital flows are mostly between developed countries and for "diversification finance."
within the policy choice when confronting large foreign capital inflows.
When foreign capital flows in, the monetary authority can use either full, or partial, or no sterilization. With partial or no sterilized intervention, the ensuing monetary expansion will push inflation to increase and could deteriorate the current account, due to the loss of competitiveness from the real exchange rate appreciation.
As a result, foreign capital inflows can drive the current account to change. On the other hand, when there is complete sterilization, foreign reserves will increase and the current account will not be affected. Hence, no relationship can be detected between foreign capital inflows and the current account. However, this non-causality might prove to be short-lived. As Calvo (1991) Although the current account and financial account are the components of the balance of payment accounting, economic theory indicates that causal relationships can be established between these two accounts. These causal relationships vary depending upon the economic and financial structures that a country has. Moreover, the possible external factors and related policy responses, such as our discussion of the massive capital inflows to the EMCs, will also affect the causal relationship.
The causal relation between foreign capital inflows and the current account
Few studies focus on the causal relationship between capital mobility and current account imbalance. In the following, we review briefly these articles and thereafter present the motivation of this paper.
a. Causal relationship between current account and financial account
Up to date, few papers study the causality between the current account (CA) and net foreign capital flows (i.e. financial account, FA). 11 Fry, et al. (1995) In this paper the foreign capital flows represent the net capital inflows which are known as the financial account in the balance of payment accounting. 12 Fry, et al. (1995) used an error correction model, which assumes that CA and FA will have co-movements in the long run, and a Granger non-causality can be tested. Although the method used in Fry, et al. (1995) is seminal, the results are rather unreliable, because of its rather short sample size and they uniformly used one lag in the error correction model. In addition, CA and FA are not pre-tested whether they are stationary. 13 The causal relationship found in Wong and Carranza (1999) is intuitively straightforward. When capital mobility is under restriction, the current account will govern the major motion in the balance-of-payment accounting, and therefore the current account causes the financial account. When the capital account is liberalized, with an unsophisticated domestic financial system to channel and monitor inflowing funds, the current account is susceptible to the influence of foreign capital flows. 14 Sarisoy-Guerin (2004) investigated annual data, starting variously from the 1960s up to 2000 for 20 developing and 20 developed countries. Abiding by the rule of the same integrated order in order to run the causal relation regression between CA and FA, he applied either the standard Granger-causality test or the co-integration error correction causality test. However, pre-testing the unit root to identify the same integrated order reduces the number of qualified countries for the causality test to less than half. mobility (since 1989). In addition, by adding two controlled variables (exchange rate and GDP) in the Granger-causality test regression for 5 developing countries (including Argentina, Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, and Thailand) and 5 developed countries (including France, Germany, Japan, U.K., and the U.S.), Yan (2005) found that it is mostly true that CA Granger-causes FA for the 5 developed countries, while it is other way around for the 5 developing countries. technology, which might complement domestic investment and be beneficial to economic growth, and therefore they can have positive effects on domestic investment and savings. It is also possible that foreign capital inflows might substitute out domestic investment, and a profligate government and a released liquidity-constraint in the private sector can worsen domestic savings, as argued by Griffin and Enos (1970) . 16 Therefore, depending upon the government policy and economic agents' behavior, foreign capital inflows can either worsen or improve national savings or domestic investment, and therefore the current account can be duly affected. For instance, in his study of distinguishing the causes of Mexico's 1994-95 peso crisis and the Asian 1997-98 financial crisis, although persistent current account deficits were perceived in both crises, Bustelo (2000) suggested that foreign capital inflows mainly were channeled to increase consumption (decrease national savings) in Mexico, but to increase investment for the Asian countries. Apparently, there could be different causality directions between S and I, and FAI, and to identify which component of the current account will be affected by foreign capital inflows certainly has meaningful policy implications. Japan and the U.K., we find no clear sign of the correlation between CA and FAI. It is worth noting that for developed countries, although persistent current account imbalances are not rare, there is no sign of a sudden reversal in CA as seen in the EMCs. Table 1 shows the detailed descriptive statistics of mean, standard deviation, and correlation coefficients for S, I, and FAI. Some interesting information can be read.
Data and Testing Strategies
The first is that the means of CA in terms of GDP are mostly moderate (the difference between the mean of S and I) either for CA surplus countries (Indonesia, 0%; South Korea, 1%; Thailand, 2%; Japan, 2%) or CA deficit countries (Argentina, -1%;
Mexico, -4%; Australia, -5%; Canada -0.2%; U.K., -1%; and U.S., -2%). Australia and Mexico both surpass 4% for CA deficit, and the U.S. CA imbalance seems not to be as astonishingly high as what is shown recently from the average of the whole time horizon. This implies that the current account seems to follow a mean-reversal process, as shown in Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (1996) . 19 The second is that the correlation between S and I is mostly over 0.50, and Indonesia and Japan are even higher than 0.90. 20 The argument that free capital mobility is supposed to have a low correlation 19 When an intertemporal current account balance holds, this implies that the current account imbalance cannot deviate from the sustainable path far away for too long. Trehan and Walsh (1991) proposed a unit root test to test whether the U.S. current account deficit is sustainable. 20 Argentina has an unusually negative correlation between S and I, -0.14. This is because of the short sample range used and the currency crisis occurred in [2001] [2002] . The long-waited resolution on its foreign debt brought uncertainty and deteriorated the investment incentives even though national savings jumped up after the crisis as shown in Figure 1 . Regarding the causes of Argentina's between S and I as proposed by Feldstein and Horioka (1980) seems not to appear either in our sample countries.
The third point is that, in theory, it is possible that an inflow of foreign capital will increase domestic savings if GDP increases. On the contrary, an inflow of foreign capital might unleash the liquidity constraint and hence increase consumption and lower national savings. On the other hand, foreign capital inflows can be a complement or substitute for domestic investment. If foreign capital inflows complement domestic investment, then they will enhance domestic investment.
Conversely, if foreign capital inflows serve as a substitute, then it will have a negative effect on domestic investment. sovereignty debt defaults, see Hausmann and Velasco (2002) .
Augmented VAR
A traditional non-Granger causality test, as proposed by Granger (1969) , is based on a VAR model and each variable in the model needs to be stationary, or integrated with order 0, denoted as I(0). As noted in Nelson and Plosser (1982) Dolado and Lütkepohl (1996) and Toda and Yamamoto (1995) .
In the following, we briefly describe how to apply this methodology.
a. Causality between CA and FAI
We first investigate the causal relationship between CA and FAI and estimate the following VAR (Vector Autoregression) system to test the Granger non-causality: 
where CA, FAI, and V represent the current account, gross foreign capital inflows, and error term, respectively; α is a constant term; β and γ denote coefficients to be 
21 Except for using the LR test as a criterion to determine the lag order, there are two other frequently used criteria: the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC). In general, the SIC chooses fewer lags and the AIC picks more lags, compared to LR. The sequential LR tests are implemented by the estimation using 12 lags, and if the sample size is small, then we start with fewer lags. The restricted model is then estimated by using 11 lags. The LR test looks to see whether there is any significant difference between these two models. If there is not, then we sequentially test down the lag and select the model when a significant result appears.
where S and I respectively represent national savings and investment, and the rest of the variables and coefficients to be estimated are the same as defined in equation 1 
Empirical Results and Discussions
We first implement the unit root test to assure whether there exist different integrated orders for each variable in each country. By using the ADF unit root test, as proposed by Dickey and Fuller (1979) , Table 2 shows that most variables are I(1), some are I(0), and a few are I(2), such as Thailand's CA, S, and I, and CA and S of the U.S. 22 The rather complicated combination of different integrated orders of the variables for each country vindicates the advantage of using the augmented VAR estimation for the Granger non-causality test.
Empirical results
We first present the causal results by using gross foreign capital inflows, FAI. In order to examine whether there is any difference in using net from gross foreign capital inflows, we also present the results using net foreign capital inflows, FA. The 22 Using the other unit root test of Philips and Perron (1987), we also find out that Thailand's current account, national savings, and investment and the U.S. current account and national savings could be the I(1) process. Using I(1) instead for these variables in the causality estimation and test, the results are the same with those presented in Tables 3-6 when I(2) are used.
estimation method and procedure when using FA instead are the same as when FAI is used.
a. Causal relationship by using gross foreign capital inflows
Results of the Granger non-causality test are shown in Tables 3a, 3b , 4a, and 4b. In sum, the results in Tables 4a and 4b are consistent with those of Tables 3a and   3b . For EMCs, it is mostly true that FAI Granger-causes CA or S and (or) I, while for the developed countries, except for Canada, there is no significant causal relationship detected between FAI and CA, or FAI, and S and I.
b. Causal relationship by using net foreign capital inflows
In order to compare the results, we also execute the causal relationship using net foreign capital inflows (represented by FA). 23 The results are shown in Tables 5 and 6 for the causality direction test of CA and FA and for S, I, and FA, respectively. For
EMCs, as shown in Table 5a , except for Mexico which shows a bi-directional causal relationship, the rest are consistent with those which we find in cases of CA and FAI.
For developed countries, the results are different from the causal relationship between CA and FAI. In Table 5a we find that CA significantly Granger-causes FA under the 1% significance level for all the developed countries except Japan. In addition, there are also causal relationships going from FA to CA under the 5% significance level in Australia and the U.K.
In Tables 6a and 6b 
Discussions
Extant studies on the causal relationship between current account and foreign capital inflows use net foreign capital inflows, which represent the difference between foreign and domestic residents' international investment behavior. If we want to know how foreign investors affect domestic current account imbalances, then it is more suitable to use gross foreign capital inflows. Although using gross foreign capital inflows results in negligent causal relationships in developed countries, the results of causality direction remain the same for emerging market countries. Unlike developed countries, foreign capital inflows do cause the current account to move toward an imbalance for EMCs.
What can bring about different causal relationships of foreign capital inflows and current account imbalances between developed countries and EMCs? In the following we show three reasons. Note that these three reasons are not necessarily independent, but they are quite often interrelated.
The first reason emphasizes on whether the current account imbalances are home-grown or instigated by external factors. The historical evidence shows that for developed countries the current account deficit is mostly home-grown, while for developing countries the current account deficit is usually pushed by foreign capital inflows. Take the U.S. as an example of a developed country. Some argue that the persistent U.S. current account deficit is due to its immense investment opportunities and a promising future, because of the "New Economy" which can generate great wealth for the future. Therefore, the domestic investment and current consumption are induced to go higher. However, for EMCs the current account deficit usually occurs due to external factors (in contrast to the internal factors in developed countries) on foreign capital inflows, as indicated in Calvo, et al. (1993) . Therefore, for EMCs foreign capital inflows more likely serve as a supply-push on current account imbalances.
The second reason regards the sophistication of the financial system. Reinhart and Reinhart (1998) argued that due to lax regulations and imprudent supervision on the financial systems in EMCs, recklessly dismantling capital account restrictions is dangerous. Bacchetta and Wincoop (2000) suggested that due to the low absorptive capacity of the financial system, once capital mobility is liberalized, overshooting occurs as well as a high volatility phenomenon of inflowing capitals in developing countries. The experience of the EMCs' crises in the 1990s validates that liberalizing foreign capital flows accompanied with a pegged exchange rate regime usually leads to a persistent current account deficit and warrants a currency crisis (Bustelo, 2000) . Caballero, et al. (2005) opined that the flexible exchange rate regime, domestic currency-denominated debt instruments, and a relatively sound financial system enable Australia to tap international capital markets blessingly.
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The third reason is about the adjustment of the current account imbalance. For 24 The Australian experience of smoothly sailing through the persistent current account deficit during the 1980s and the turbulent period of the Asian 1997-98 crisis vindicates that it is groundless to worry about the current account imbalance in the U.S.
developing countries, Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (2000) and Calvo, et al. (2006) showed that current account reversal is likely to accompany a disruptive adjustment, such as a contractionary devaluation with an enormous loss of GDP as noted in Frankel (2005) . 25 For industrial countries, Freund (2000), Debelle and Galati (2005) , and Croke, et al. (2005) found that differing from the emerging market countrieswhich suffered a devastating contractionary depreciation when adjusting their current account imbalances -industrial countries' adjustment process were usually accompanied with a benign recession and disorderly corrections seldom occurred.
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Conclusion
The resurgence of international capital flows since the end of the 1980s has instigated discussions on the relevant issue of the global current account imbalance.
Whether the U.S. current account imbalance will unravel in a disorderly way like what occurred in emerging market countries' financial crises during the 1990s is a pending question for anyone to guess. The Australian experience of decades' worth of current account deficits without suffering from the plight of capital account crises as what occurred in emerging market countries in the 1990s provides another guide as to how the issue of the U.S. current account deficit might wind up. In this paper we empirically demonstrate the disparity of the causal relationships on the current account and foreign capital inflows between developed countries and emerging 25 During sudden stop episodes, when foreign financing quickly dries up, consumption and investment contract, and output quickly slumps. Calvo, et al. (2006) found that output in Mexico declined by 4.8% between 1981 and 1983 and by 6.2% between 1994 and 1995, while in South Korea it declined by 6.9% between 1997 and 1998 , and in Thailand by 11.7% between 1996 and 1998 . Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (2000 studied reversals in a sample of 105 low-income and middle-income countries between 1970 and 1996. They presented that, for the median country, the current account deficit shrank dramatically -by 7.4% of GDP (going from 10.3% to 2.9%). 26 Freund (2000), Debelle and Galati (2005) , and Croke, et al. (2005) identified the period of the current account reversal based on the threshold of a 2% (or 5%) deficit, and then analyzed what the national savings and investment changes were prior to, during, and after the current account reversals. Principally, they found that a decline in saving rates takes place before adjustment, thus leading the current account balance to deteriorate. Contrarily, investment rates start declining after the onset of adjustment, and this leads to the correction of current account deficits. market countries. In addition, this paper contributes to the study of the causal relationship between the current account imbalance and foreign capital inflows in three respects.
For the first look, distinct from the extant studies that usually investigate the causality direction between the current account and net foreign capital inflows, this paper emphasizes on using the gross foreign capital inflows instead. Due to net foreign capital inflows being the difference between domestic and foreign investors' decisions, using gross foreign capital inflows is more suitable to examine how real foreign capital inflows affect the current account. The empirical results show that, for emerging market countries, it is mostly true that foreign capital inflows cause the current account imbalance. However, for developed countries there is no significant causal relationship detected. Current accounts of emerging market countries are susceptible to the influence of foreign capital inflows.
The second aspect is we find that foreign capital inflows Granger-cause either national savings or investment for emerging market countries, but for developed countries there is a lack of evidence of causal relationships between foreign capital inflows and national savings and investment. The findings of causality direction between foreign capital inflows and national savings or investment or both highlight where the foreign funds are channeled to and certainly have meaningful policy implications.
The third point is we summarize three reasons that can bring about the different causal relationships between emerging market countries and developed countries:
whether causes of foreign capital inflows result from internal or external factors, whether the adjustment process of current account reversals is moderate or abrupt, and how sophisticated the financial system is to absorb massive foreign capital inflows. Dickey and Fuller (1984) , and the regression is executed with the constant term. The sample range is listed beside the name of the country. In Thailand and the U.S.A., we detect variables with the 2 nd integrated order. χ . The number in the parenthesis beside the modified Wald test statistics is the P-value. ***, **, and * represent the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively. Note: The left scale (the lower part) is for current account (CA) and foreign capital inflows (FAI), which are represented by the solid and dotted lines, respectively. The right scale (the upper part) is for the national savings (S) and investment (I), which are presented by solid and dotted lines, respectively. All the variables are in terms of GDP.
